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 PART IV: PLACING ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 
Labour Unions 
 
There are few places in the world where the organised labour movement has historically been 
able to play such a decisive role in the political and economic arena as South America. 
However, labour’s disproportionate influence on the institutions of governance continues to 
defy its weak bargaining position with respect to capital at shop floor level and symbolises a 
series of paradoxes in relation to this actor; Union density in the region is relatively low, 
rarely exceeding a fifth of the workforce. Yet labour possesses an innate capacity to paralyse 
the production process, continually forcing elite actors to offer improved wages and 
conditions either following industrial unrest or in order to prevent it.  
Further, outside of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, collective bargaining rights are 
only offered to unions that are enterprise-based (members work for the same company rather 
than within the same trade), yet curiously they exist as highly politicised and often radical 
actors that regularly extend their militancy and demands beyond the workplace to pressure 
state institutions, extra-governmental organisations and public opinion in pursuit of their 
broaderpolitical aims. Another contradiction is that the labour legislation that exists in South 
America is perhaps the strongest in the world in terms of protecting both collective and 
individual rights, yetweak rule of law has often permitted both private employers and the 
state itself to violate legislation with virtual impunity.  
Finally, despite its unquestionable potential as an actor, labour has often constrained 
its attempts to defend worker interests because of its reliance on the state for its power and 
privileges. Thus, labour unions have developed a dual-role in terms of the policy-making 
process, acting on the one hand as a ‘producer’of policy which has been mobilised to 
establish the provision of public services, industry nationalisations and labour protections, 
whilst on the other, as a product of them, often suffering as these are rolled back through 
violence, co-optation or compromise. At different points in time and space across the region, 
such attacks have been both aggressively resisted and passively accepted. 
This chapter explores how labour has influenced, and continues to influence the 
nature of government in South American countries. In doing so, many of its contradictions 
are explained by a focus on the interplay between the multiple layers and distinct modalities 
of governance at international, regional, national based levels of policy. Whilst the region’s 
heterogeneity means that certain industrial relations developments have been highly notorious 
in some countries but barely observable in others at different periods through time, the 
chapter thematically and chronologically analyses broad episodes of labour governance in its 
different sections. 
 
Labour and the forming of regional governance characteristics under Import-
Substitution Industrialisation (1900s-40s) 
 
It is important to highlight several features of South America’s state formation processes in 
the nineteenth century and then, of its industrial developmentas labour unions began to form 
during the early days, whichhad a profound impact on the evolution of the region’s labour 
law and industrial relations practices.  
First, these newly independent countries inherited a cultural legacy of state 
intervention and bureaucracy from Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule. These help to 
explain the indelible legacy of state regulation in the labour market and why most countries 
developed comprehensive labour codes or extensive legislation that protect both individual 
and collective worker rights. They also established a pattern of state-labour relations that 
normalised the formers’ intervention in union affairs, with Uruguay providing the only 
exception (Bronstein, 2010:18). As a consequence, the creation of labour laws tended to be 
influenced by western European colonial constitutions, especially those of France and Spain. 
The Mussolinian Rocco Act of 1925 in Italy established the foundations for trade union 
regulation in Argentina and Brazil, whilst the US system and its National Labor Relations 
Act, 1935 inspired the prevention of unfair labour practices in Argentina and Chile. 
 Secondly, labour became a central political actor in national affairs across the region 
because as Leon Trotsky observed while in exile in Mexico in the late-1930s, the course of 
Latin American development had not produced a strong, national capitalist class due to 
foreign capitalists having played such a dominant role in the still ‘semi-colonial’ economies 
which were themselves placed in a subservient trading relationship. The domestic bourgeoisie 
was therefore in a weak position, which would result in: 
The proletariat soon begins playing the most important role in the life of the 
country. In these conditions the national government, to the extent that it tries to 
show resistance to foreign capital, is compelled…to lean on the proletariat 
(Trotsky, 1941:40-43). 
 
However, he also warned that whereas in some cases this would result in increased 
recognition for organised labour and real opportunities for the working-class which would 
possess considerable political leverage over domestic bourgeois leaders, he also speculated 
that the danger existed that if the governments of such backward economies deemed it more 
profitable to ally with foreign capital, they would hence seek to destroy labour organisations 
and institute more totalitarian forms of regime so as to attract foreign investment (Collier, 
1991:43). Trotsky’s predictions proved to be chillingly accurate given the number of 
countries in South America that established populist, ‘labour-friendly’ regimes and the 
equally high incidence of subsequent military dictatorships that materialised with the explicit 
aim of destroying labour in the interests of foreign capital so as to engender neo-liberalism. 
His perspective helps explain the potential political strength that labour had at the time and 
also why it was important that those who governed as pro-industrial nationalists and anti-
communists sought accommodation with labour by co-opting the movement, as the 
corporatist Estado Novo regime of General Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1937-45) and that of 
General Juan Perón in Argentina (from 1943 as Labour Minister then as President, 1946-55) 
exemplify.  
Thirdly,and related to the above  point and domestic capital’s attempts to strengthen 
its weak position in relation to western foreign elites, despite the best efforts of the architects 
of Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), to a greater or lesser degree, each of South 
America’s economies remained highly dependent on the prosperity of their key primary 
sector export markets for economic growth. These enabled capital accumulation and the 
required foreign exchange earnings to import the necessary capital and technology for 
industrialisation and national development. Structuralists argue that it is this which provides 
political and economic leverage to workers in these key export sectors of natural resource 
extraction, placing them in a strategic position to influence the attitudes and actions of the 
rest of the labour movement. The level of opportunity that the organised labour movement 
had to obtain a strong bargaining position not just in the workplace but also in terms of 
Government policy vis-a-vis labour interests correlated directly with the relative, national 
importance of such exports to the overall economy (and usually the proportion of the 
workforce employed in these sectors). 
The implications for labour governance largely depended upon whether workers in 
these sectors chose to become a vanguard for general worker interests or elevated themselves 
to the position of ‘labour aristocracy’ and detached themselves from the rest of the labour 
movement.A key task of the state was to isolate and co-opt these influential and powerful 
sectors of the labour movement to encourage them to look inwards, rather than to radicalise 
the broader workers nationally. Venezuela’s oil workers were an example, gaining a number 
of welfare concessions in the 1930s and 40s but which acted as an exclusive enclave group 
without asserting pressure on the state to extend their hard-fought privileges to the rest of the 
movement (Ellner, 1993:144).  
Both governments that were antagonistic to labour and those which aimed to achieve 
class compromise with it found it easier to assert their authority and contain labour unrest 
when militant working-class strongholds were geographically contained rather than dispersed 
as they could either pay them of, or simply benefit from the spatial barriers that prevented the 
spread of this threat. This was trueeven when ‘enclave industry workers’ controlled a 
strategically vital sector and were both militant and outward-looking in aiming to assert 
political pressure on their government to benefit the entire labour movement. For instance, 
despite their important role in the 1952 revolution, the Bolivian tin-miners were heavily 
confined to working in small enclave communities, while the vast majority of Bolivians 
effectively worked as serfs on large estates in remote rural areas (Spalding, 1977: 210). 
Therefore the lack of dispersion of working-class strongholds in Bolivian industry helped 
account for the reasons why labour rights were not consolidated in the long-term. 
Meanwhile, the industrialisation programmes pursued by South American states from 
the 1930s onwards involved the state defending national industry and playing a coordinating 
role in the economy. Under ISI, imports were substituted with domestically-produced goods 
and protectionist customs barriers were implemented. Backed by the UN’s Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), it followed that the state should 
also provide significant protections to the local workforce.It was able to do this because 
domestic markets were closed to international competition, so doing so would barely affect 
industrial competitiveness due to the high concentration of industry. Further, because all 
national employers were all bound by the same labour laws, they shared comparable labour 
costs (Bronstein, 2010:22).Nevertheless, the populist regimes that implemented the ISI model 
both advanced the interests of official labour unions, yet also contained their political 
demands to the confines of reformism.Whilst such improvements in wages and conditions 
were rarely simply gifted by pro-labour governments but had to be fought for through strikes 
and other disruptions to the production process (ADD REF), raised living standards and an 
apparently supportive state limited the extent to which the need for a revolutionary overthrow 
of the state was deemed desirable in the minds of many workers.  
Nevertheless, ISI did help to create many of the economic, social and political 
conditions for organised labour to become a powerful and potentially revolutionary actor in 
the first place. In different countries and at certain points in time, governments had to choose 
whether to violently suppress, accommodate or completely cede to its demands, with the 
former most likely when labour was deemed to have become too highly autonomous or 
difficult to co-opt. For instance, the model entailed an explosion in the size of the working-
class, alongside membership of labour unions as industry expanded. Governments, especially 
in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile designed programmes to attract skilled European 
immigrants to its urban centres in an attempt to both fill labour shortages and also “whiten” 
their societies in the name of progress and Europeanization at the expense of the mestizo. 
The contradiction of this policy was that often, governments were inadvertently 
“importing” revolutionary ideologies like anarchism, syndicalism and communism which 
many of these immigrant workers (especially political exiles from Italy, Spain and Russia) 
advocated, as well as the new organising methods that they brought with them. The 
‘demonstrative affect’ of European labour movements, especially the anarcho-syndicalists in 
Spain and Italy during the 1920s/30s and the Russian Revolution and Communist 
International inspired both national and immigrant labour across South America as real-life 
examples of workers control that showed that organising to improve labour’s political 
standing was possible to achieve (Collier, 1991:60). The proliferation of new radical ideas 
was facilitated by an increase in literacy levels which many governments sponsored by 
universalising state education and expanding the university system and the introduction of the 
printed press and radio at the start of the century. Mass audiences could be reached for the 
first time (Spalding, 1977: 10). 
Urbanization was also encouraged by facilitating migrant labour from the countryside. 
Many elites hoped that this policy would help to pacify and dilute an increasingly radical 
workforce first, because such rural migrants were accustomed to patron-client working 
relationships in which they were completely submissive to their landowners and bosses and 
secondly because by increasing the supply of labour, it would make workers easier to replace, 
and so reduce their bargaining power and militancy. Some academics produced research to 
suggest that this did indeed disincline them from taking collective action (Erickson, 
1977:120), whilst others argue that being thrust into the workings of mass production having 
been uprooted from a small farm or rural town provided them with a ‘rude-awakening’ as to 
their class interests (Brennan, 1994:85). It is certainly the case that sometimes friction 
emerged between newly-arrived immigrant workers and those natives from the countryside in 
the competition to take up jobs that were being created in industry (Collier, 1991: 65), 
however more often than not, as they interacted with each other on the factory floor, shared 
grievances and class positions were identified. Emancipatory ideas thus penetrated deeper 
into the labour movement as migrant workerswereexposed to these new and ‘dangerous’ 
ideas for the first time.  
At the same time, urbanisation also improved the possibilities for workers to organise 
collectively within factories in ways that were previously unimaginable when dispersed and 
rural-based. Colombian coffee-growers for instance could easily be manipulated by 
landowners and were replaceable given the low-skilled nature of their work. In the factory 
setting, workers became much less governable. In the age of mass-production, relatively 
high-skilled workers, operating machinery possessed greater control over the production 
process to demand improved terms.  
However, initially early labour legislation was enacted to grant concessions to 
workers movements’ not so much in order to contain the emerging labour threat but for 
reasons of political expediency. For instance in 1905 Sunday was introduced as a rest day in 
Argentina and Colombia, and the eight-hour day became law in Uruguay and Ecuador in 
1915 and 1916 respectively. However, these reforms reflected the political changes that were 
taking place at the time, as rural oligarchies in the extractive sectors began to lose control to 
the urban bourgeoisie. However, the latter introducedlabour protections in order to construct 
alliances with the urban proletariat against the latifundistas. In 1924, Chile adopted one of the 
first ever laws on the contract of employment and labour codes were adapted in every country 
in South America by early 1950s.Meanwhile, some employers began adopt more subtle 
methods to dilute labour’s growing potency: By employing greater numbers of female 
workers downward pressure was placed on wages and this also induced gender tensions 
which would divide some workplaces (Brown, 1997:6). The extent to which labour could be 
controlled depended partly on how tight local and national labour markets were, with 
movements tending to be stronger and more difficult to control where there were labour 
shortages. This is why the assimilation of female, migrant and foreign workers into South 
American labour market was a key elite tactic. 
Indeed up until the mid-twentieth century, capitalist elites generally tolerated labour 
unions, especially in countries where they were they were more established and so felt less 
threat to their authority. This was because union demands tended to be restricted to 
workplace issues and collective bargaining rights, given that they were excluded from 
suffrage up until that point. This changed once universal suffrage was granted as workers 
became an electoral constituency for political parties and elites that were competing for 
power (Murillo, 2003:101). The success of labour’s political strategies at this stage depended 
both on whether their political allies (in particular pro-labour parties) held power or were in 
opposition and also on whether the union itself was strong enough to assert its demands. 
Many national labour unions allied or affiliated to political parties, for instance in Peru the 
Workers Confederation of Peru (CTP) allied with APRA, in Chile the Chilean Workers 
Federation (FOCH) allied with the Communist party whilst others joined with socialists and 
anarchists. When the above two conditions existed, such as in Argentina under Peronism and 
its ally, the General Workers Union (CGT), it even led to the collective bargaining 
agreements becoming compulsory in 1952. Yet when the allied party was in opposition, 
governments would curtail unions for instance by restricting them to organising at company, 
not trade level (e.g. Chile).  
Opening up another contradiction, whereby the expansion of political rights which 
was supposed to act as an fig leaf to pacify labour, in many cases, it actually led to unions’ 
demands broadening further to cover social rights, welfare and political exigencies,  which  
heightened the threat to the existing capitalist order. In certain cases outlined in the following 
section, this eventually provoked a harsh backlash from the state, which became more 
prepared to employ force to crush organised labour in countries and industries where radical 
elements were more prominent (Spalding, 1977). 
In terms of labour governance systems that were to follow in the next stage of 
political development after the introduction of universal suffrage and the formation and 
growth of labour unions in South America, Ruth and David Collier’s (1991) comparative 
analysis (see Table 1) of how social and economic conditions impacted the emergence of 
respective national labour movements across the region in the early twentieth century, several 
fascinating path-dependent insights are provided. Based on a study of many of the variables 
covered so far in this chapter, they found that Argentina developed the most favourable 
conditions, closely followed by Chile and Uruguay, then Brazil, with Colombia and 
Venezuela possessing the weakest. Strikingly it manifests a direct relationship between the 
strength of organised labour formation and subsequent degrees of co-option of the movement 
by the ruling capitalist elites wishing to control it.  
 
Table 1: Conditions Supportive of Labour development 
 Chile Brazil Venezuela Uruguay Colombia Peru Argentina 
Working class size 2 4 0 1 1 0 4 
Economic 
indicators 
3 2 0 3 1 0 4 
Urbanisation 3 0 3 4 1 4 3 
Enclave industries 4 0 0/4 0 2 4 0 
European 
immigrants 
2 4 1 4 1 1 4 
Labour surplus 2 2/1 2 3 1 1 3 
Total 16 12/11 6/10 15 7 10 17 
 
Source: Adapted from Collier and Collier, 1991:95. Scores given to estimated ‘favourability’ 
of conditions 4 = very favourable, 3 = favourable, 2 = neutral, 1 = unfavourable, 0 = Very 
unfavourable Where slashes are used it indicates a change in ‘score’ due to rapid shift during 
timeframe. 
 
What is apparent is that the more conducive the conditions for a powerful organised 
labour movement to emerge, the greater the potential ‘threat’ level to the established order 
and the more urgent the need to first attempt to control, then crush labour by the ruling class 
through authoritarian means later on. In the top three countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay 
and Brazil), their histories were littered with spells of military dictatorships, with those of the 
1970s and 80s holding the expressed intention of eliminating highly politicised labour 
movements. Yet in the two weakest (Colombia and Venezuela), these remained democratic 
bar only short periods of military rule (1953-57 and 1952-58 respectively) with political pacts 
(the Frente Nacional and the Pacto de Punto Fijo) agreed upon between political elites, 
including labour-aligned political parties as labour could be contained through less coercive 
means. The next section analyses governance and labour unions in each country in the 
regimes that followed in more detail. 
 Containing the genie: Unions under dictatorships, corporatism and pacted democracies 
(1950s-70s) 
The legacy of labour unions’ rapid growth and radicalisation at the same time as 
universal suffrage was applied in the region was that governments of all political persuasions 
had to on the one hand seek to avoid labour unrest, while on the other treat the unions as a 
potential electoral constituency. Thus, by the 1950s even those governments that were far 
from pro-labour found themselves with little choice but to regulate labour markets and ensure 
them basic protections. It was at this moment that many workers realised that pressuring 
governments into granting state regulation (minimum salaries, vacations etc) was more 
achievable than collective bargaining with their employers at factory level, given that union 
densities were usually low (Sigal and Torre, 1979). This politicised the movement further and 
in a context of political volatility, economic protectionism and state interventionism (until the 
1990s), embedded a culture of national demand-making to governments being prioritised 
over local shopfloor organising. Whilst the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes that followed 
in the southern cone were partially successful in depoliticising society, the unions usually 
remained staunchly political in character and played key roles as a pro-democracy force (for 
instance they helped to found the Workers Party in Brazil) during this time. Labour unions’ 
preference for national rather than local organising and their highly politicised nature endures 
today. 
So post-industrialisation, by the latter half of the twentieth century, organised labour 
was a powerful, often radical social actor which was also highly influential in South 
American governance. However, in those countries where the working class became too large 
or too powerful and the middle class felt threatened, Nun (1967) concluded that the latter 
aligned itself with the military or the landed elites to establish anti-labour authoritarian 
regimes.  Labour itself was far from the consistent champion of democracy as it is often 
depicted by influential scholars (Rueschmeuer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992) and evidence 
suggests that its support for democracy after 1945 depended upon two factors. First, the 
nature of their partisan political alliances and secondly whether labour leaders believed that 
alternative regime types to democracy would deliver greater material and organisational 
benefits to workers to democratic ones. In Argentina, many Peronist union leaders supported 
General Ongania’s 1966 coup which deposed of the elected Radical President Arturo Illia 
because they believed that it would weaken their main political rival, the Radical Civic Union 
(UCR). Meanwhile, in Peru, a significant part of the labour movement supported the left-
wing military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), including the Confederation 
of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP) which the military established to control the 
workers’ movement. Despite the fact that the principle loser was the CTP, which the 
Velasco’s administration sought to undermine (by pressuring individual unions to desert it, 
removing the legal status of its affiliated unions or by pressuring employers not to participate 
in collective bargaining with them), as the hegemonic union confederation until that point, it 
did not vocally oppose the regime, preferring to passively ride out the situation until 
democracy was restored, organising only 1-7 percent of all strikes during that period 
(Alexander and Parker, 2007). Meanwhile in Chile and Bolivia, the unions engaged in 
strategies that placed democracy in danger. To this degree, South American labour 
movements were what Levitsky and Mainwaring (2002) describe as “contingent democrats.” 
So how can the different labour governance regimes that emerged in South America 
in the latter half of the twentieth century be explained?  
First, the fact that industrialisation occurred within a much faster timeframe in Latin 
America than in Europe had intriguing consequences. On the one hand the labour movement 
was no doubt strengthened by the fact that it could import or adopt European strategies for 
workplace organisation and  political ideologies rather than have to ‘discover them’ like their 
European comrades. These strategies were learned either by conduit, through the arrival of 
European immigrants and exiles into the labour movement or via more direct cross-
dissemination through global union federations and such. However rapid industrialisation 
also implied a weakness because it meant that the collective learning experience for workers 
was cut short as the development of class-consciousness that long-term struggle permits did 
not occur (Spalding, 1977). This stunted possibilities for labour unions to grow autonomously 
and cultivated an attitude of class compromise among South American movements which 
made them relatively more susceptible to the appeal of corporatism and agreement-making 
with the domestic bourgeoisie than their western European counterparts which outside of 
Italy, German and a small number of others barely grabbed a foothold in the ‘old continent’. 
The main “achievement” of corporatist models of governance from an elite 
perspective was that in co-opting a privileged sector of the labour movement such as the 
General Workers Confederation (CGT) since the Peronist era in Argentina (1943-55), it has 
ultimately served to significantly fragment and divide the labour movement. Even today, 
other labour union confederations such as the Argentinean Workers Confederation (CTA) are 
not granted full legal status. State controlled labour unions and their members often benefited 
from more favourable wages and conditions and the fact that the regimes such as that of Juan 
Perón required the mobilization of significant sectors of the urban working class has led them 
to be labelled ‘populist’. However, their exclusionary nature and the sometimes suppression 
or prohibition of unauthorised unions was to the detriment of workers as a class, benefitting 
both foreign and domestic capital (Spalding, 1977:151). 
Bergquist (1986:12) observes the how patterns of governance across the region was 
also influenced by the configuration of labour’s alliances vis-a-vis the ‘class and national 
dichotomy’ in the key export industries where it was especially influential. In cases where 
there was a high concentration of foreign-held capital yet these workers did not feel that 
foreign multinationals were aiding vigorous and sustained national development, they tended 
to make alliances with anti-capitalist forces, including communists as their sense of 
imperialist exploitation was more acute. Anti-capitalist influence among the labour 
movement was thus particularly high in Chile, workers tended to perceive themselves as a 
separate contending class to their employers and the trade unions came to be headed by 
Marxists. A relatively united and autonomous labour union, the United Labor Federation 
(CUT) resulted. This became the most extensive labour movement in the region (1953-1973), 
incorporating communists, anarchists and socialists before being disbanded by General 
Pinochet. On the other hand, where these structural conditions were reversed and capital 
ownership was relatively more concentrated in the hands of the domestic bourgeoisie in cases 
where it was also deemed to be rather successful at fostering national economic development, 
(and there was also a higher degree of ethnic diversity among labour’s rank-and-file) as was 
the case in Argentina, patriotic sentiments could be more easily turned against labour. 
Workers not only came to understand their situation less as one of dominance by imperial 
powers in a global capitalist order, but due to domestic bourgeoisie’s success, they often 
believed that certain class interests could be shared. This helps explain why Argentina’s 
labour movement tended towards a corporatist governance model to build an alliance with 
national industrialists. 
Whilst corporatism provided the perfect bulwark against the development of a united 
and autonomous labour movement (as it relied on the consent rather than coercion of the 
majority union as military dictatorships usually entailed), elite dominance over labour 
occasionally broke down under very particular circumstances. Perhaps most infamously, 
during the 1969 Cordobazo what made the labour movement particularly powerful and united 
in the Argentinean province of Cordoba was an unusually strong regional affinity and an 
opposition among labour leaders (even those professing to be Peronist) to what they saw as 
Porteño interference (from central government) in their industrial affairs. Because the 
working class saw itself as Cordobés, they tended to adopt a more class-orientated position 
which united workers, made labour more autonomous and improved the chances of 
successful outcomes of industrial action (Brennan, 1994:347). 
Of course the darkest days for workers were reserved for periods of military rule and 
especially the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Argentina (1976-83), Brazil (1964-85) 
and Uruguay (1973-85) and other forms of dictatorship in Chile (1973-89) and Paraguay 
(1954-1992). These regimes must be understood in terms of the dissatisfaction of the military 
and the bourgeois elites with the ‘populist’ governments that preceded them, which they 
perceived as responsible for the destruction of their respective economies and moral orders 
and general political instability. The high inflation, corruption and the deliberate mobilisation 
of pressure groups, in particular unionised labour which populist (and usually corporatist) 
regimes spawned were the key sources of concern for the military, which objected to what 
they saw as their ‘preferential treatment” through initiatives such as wage increases and 
income redistribution (O’Donnell, 1979). Through the establishment of military dictatorships, 
their primary motivation was to restore “order,” depoliticise society and impose strict fiscal 
and monetary discipline. That entailed the introduction of neo-liberal economic policies and 
the brutal suppression of labour unions. Tough restrictions on civil and political freedoms, 
were introduced, including, freedom of association. Labour unions were disbanded, or in 
some cases their leaders were directly appointed by the government. Labour activists endured 
imprisonment, torture or “Disappearance” while union assets were confiscated, a freeze on 
collective bargaining and a ban on strikes was imposed (Bronstein, 2010:24). The one 
exception was the ‘military revolution’ of General Velasco Alvarado in Peru. The state 
completely reorganised production and in whose interests it served, by implementing policies 
that encouraged workers to participate in ‘industrial communities’, and even workers’ self-
management in ‘socially owned’ enterprises (Empresas de Propiedad Social). Reminiscent of 
Tito's self-management programme in Yugoslavia, barely anything remains of Velasco’s 
reforms today (ibid.24).  
Finally, during this period under scrutiny, even in those states that managed to escape 
authoritarianisms of one form or another, the strengthening of organised labour was barely 
permitted. In purportedly more democratic political landscapes like Venezuela under which 
the Punto Fijo Pact (1958) guaranteed rotational governance under a two-party system, 
Ellner (1993) exposes how ruling elites developed more subtle ways to constrain class 
solidarity and labour politicisation, by atomising unions into plant-level organisation. Their 
demands thus tended to restrict themselves to workplace issues. Further, the main union, the 
Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) was allied to the Democratic Action Party (AD), 
always a risky strategy which inevitably meant that short term gains in worker rights when 
the party was in power were rolled back or halted when COPEI enjoyed their spells in power. 
Whilst the exponents of Venezuela’s ‘exceptionalism thesis’ rightly point out that labour 
relations were generally ‘consultative’ rather than ‘confrontational’ as the CTV maintained 
cordial relations with major business interests such as its Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce (Fedecámaras) and strikes were rare until the late 1980s, the thesis was blown 
apart following the 1989 Caracazo uprisings. The CTV implemented a general strike against 
austerity and Bolivar currency adjustment while tension between the AD (in power at the 
time) and CTV (Ellner, 2005). Whilst the 1990 Labour Law created national (rather than 
plant-level) labour unions, guaranteed collective bargaining and generous retirement and 
disability pensions, the case once again proved that significant concessions would only be 
granted to labour following intense periods of struggle, even under democratic governance 
regimes that should have favoured it. 
Mixed fortunes: Unions, new democracies and market reforms (1980s-90s) 
 
The unions were presented with three contradictions in terms of having been at the forefront 
of protests to end bureaucratic authoritarian rule and successfully restoring democracy in 
South America in the 1980s. First, despite their fierce resistance to the market reforms that 
the respective military Juntas had imposed, the very democracies that the labour movement 
had helped to restore, maintained continuity with the dictatorships in terms of their economic 
programmes. These included structural adjustment policies that were an affront to labour. The 
fact that market liberalisation occurred simultaneously with the restoration of democracy in 
South America presented the unions with a mixed blessing. Labour’s political effectiveness 
declined as economies were privatised further and opened up to foreign competition. As the 
public sector shrank, managers became under more pressure than ever to reduce labour costs 
where they could once prioritise industrial harmony over profit-making (Murillo, 2003:100). 
With respect to governance and labour issues, in the context of the regional debt crisis and 
Lost Decade, the approach became one of needing to stimulate ‘flexible labour markets’ as 
the neoliberal policy turn under the conditionality of the external Washington Consensus 
institutions sought to create more business-friendly environments that would attract foreign 
investment. Thus, new labour laws introduced fixed-term instead of permanent contracts, 
weakened protections against unfair dismissal, reduced limits on working-hours, encouraged 
outsourcing and subcontracting and also reduced the benefits surrounding redundancy pay.   
The second contradiction for the unions was that once the representative democracy 
that they had fought so hard for had been established, democratisation reduced the relevance 
of labour as the principal expression of citizen discontent. Unlike the era of military 
dictatorships, when the labour movement was often ‘the only show in town’ in terms of 
organised resistance (Communist parties were usually completely decimated and student 
movements were only accessible to a small part of the population), it became superseded by 
the ballot box or even the burgeoning NGO sector (as state welfare duties were slowly 
reassigned to private agents) as the prime channels for contention. 
The third paradox is the most vexing. Although the 1980s and 90s are frequently 
depicted as decades where labour rights were stripped away, unemployment soared, wages 
remained stagnant across Latin America and labour unions focus on the state as the guarantor 
of rights was challenged (Green, 2003), a host of research has also revealed several often 
neglected features of the era which at least call these generalisations into question and at best 
actually refute the ‘flexibilisation of labour governance’ thesis in certain national cases. 
Whilst the unions were still able to shape, design and schedule the implementation of the 
market reforms (Murillo, 2003), the post-dictatorship states began to relinquish their grip on 
the unions, permitting collective bargaining, freedom of association and industrial action 
once again. Indeed among the new constitutions, guarantees of workers’ rights featured 
prominently. For instance, Article 7 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution stipulated twenty-four 
separate worker protections, with Paraguay’s 1993 Labour Code offering similar stipulations 
(Bronstein, 2010:24). In some circumstances labour protections were thus even strengthened. 
Furthermore, an ILO study confirmed that between 1990 and 2005, four out of the ten South 
American countries examined (Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) either implemented no 
labour flexibilisation reforms at all or they were so minor that they made little difference in 
practice (Vega Ruiz, 2005). Argentina and Peru were deemed to have experienced the most 
profound reforms.  
It is only by disaggregating labour laws in the region into their individual and 
collective components that one can understand this paradoxical growth of labour regulation 
during the era of neoliberal reforms. In a study by Murillo and Schrank (2010:257), it was 
found that across Latin America whilst ten out of sixteen such reforms rolled back individual 
labour rights pertaining to wages, benefits and working conditions, thirteen out of eighteen 
labour reforms relating to collective rights (right to strike, collective bargaining, union 
organisation) actually added new regulations.  
This begs the question of why South American governments adopted seemingly 
costly union-friendly labour reforms during this period when neoliberal logic dictated 
reduced labour costs and greater market flexibility. Moreover, what dynamics were at play 
that determined labour’s differentiated influence over the policy-making process in each 
country? These factors can be explained by deconstructing the neoliberal labour governance 
model through the fusion of two literatures; first that of organisational union dynamics vis-à-
vis the state-labour relationship and secondly, that of how multiple layers and distinct 
modalities of governance at international, regional, national based levels weigh on decision-
makers and actors to establish policy. The interplay between these two seemingly distinct 
facets of the problem are then observed. 
First, in terms of organisational variables, governments tended to grant greater 
concessions to the unions (at least in terms of collective rights) where labour’s political allies 
were in power. For instance during the 1990s, the Peronist Party did not want to 
disenfranchise the CGT under President Menem by attacking it ‘as a union’, so adopted 
relatively union-friendly labour reforms such as the centralisation of collective bargaining, 
refusing to bow to external pressure to end union representative monopolies, and allowing its 
union ally to administer social services. President Carlos Perez whose party Accion 
Democratica remained aligned to the CTV delivered similar policies in Venezuela. Thus, 
their core constituencies were compensated for the significant erosion of individual labour 
rights in each country (Murillo and Schrank, 2010).  
Then there is the question of under what circumstances the unions themselves are 
prepared to exercise restraint or militancy to pressure governments on policy. When labour-
aligned parties were in government and threatened to enact policies that would prove contrary 
to labour’s interests, the unions generally refrained from taking vociferous contentious action 
(especially street protests and strikes) if there were no alternative political parties that were 
broadly sympathetic to labour’s interests. This is because the unions feared that if their ally 
was toppled by more conservative political opposition, the subsequent government would 
have been even more antagonistic to labour interests. However, if rival parties did exist that 
could embrace union demands, then the hitherto government-supporting union would be 
much more likely to use direct action to exert pressure on it to change policy course. It is 
thought that it was partly competition from left-wing parties, Causa R and The People’s 
Electoral Movement (MEP) that forced the hand of the CTV’s union leadership in mobilising 
their members to oppose many of AD’s proposed reforms in the 1990s (Burgess, 1998). A 
related variable is inter-union competition for members. Where unions have monopoly 
control over the workforce it increases the possibilities to extract concessions from the 
government through negotiation rather than militancy. However where competing unions 
exist in the same industry, in times of crisis like that of the 1990s neoliberal reforms, the 
leadership of the main union (whether its political ally is in power or not) will be more likely 
to engage in militant action in opposition in order to see off defection to other unions from 
disgruntled rank-and-file members (Murillo and Schrank, 2010).  
Another factor that influenced labour’s ability to affect the policy-making process at 
this time was the union structure and the level at which collective bargaining occurs. Where 
unions are highly centralised into a peak organisation, constituent members are bound by 
settlement and representation occurs at industry rather than firm level, they are able to exert 
greater pressure. For instance, the Bolivian Workers Central was highly centralised, 
incorporating industrial workers, peasants and many professions’ unions and it is thought that 
the threat of mass and unified industrial action (alongside the fragile electoral alliances they 
had with anti-neoliberal parties) was a prime factor as to why President Paz Zamora (1989-
93) and Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97) refrained from delivering significant labour reforms 
relative to other South American states, despite pressure from the US Government. 
The second major literature explaining the labour governance regimes that emerged 
under the neoliberal era is that of the dynamics between multi-layered external actors in the 
process and whether they pressured South American governments and employers to increase 
worker protections or flexibilise the labour market and erode them. In the last twenty-five 
years in particular, numerous such actors have sought to impose their influence. One major 
example of extra-state governance has been the ILO as its Core Labour Standards are 
extensively referenced in the design of modern labour law across the region. However, the 
problem has been the lack of possibilities for enforcement. Even when national judges rule 
that ILO standards ratified by the state have been contravened (most commonly around 
freedom of association issues), governments have chosen to simply ignore such rulings. For 
example, in 2008 an Argentinian Supreme Court affirmed that ILO Convention 87 (on free 
and democratic trade union organisation) was being breached as the government-aligned 
CGT union was the only one with full legal recognition (Bronstein, 2010).  
Other such actors include trading partners (some have insisted on labour standards 
provisions), international financial institutions such as the IMF which has lent on several 
governments to limit union formation and actions as well as to decentralise collective 
bargaining, and multinational corporations – some of which have Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies or have signed up to self-regulatory schemes that ensure minimum 
labour standards whilst on the others have sometimes been responsible for committing gross 
violations themselves.  
Further, influence over labour governance has also derived, perhaps unexpectedly 
from international quarters via union-supporting policy-makers and overseas governments’ 
trade pacts. For instance the US Trade and Tariff Act (1984) obliges those states with 
preferential treatment to the US market (which includes several South American states) to 
defend Core Labour Standards whilst also permitting labour and human rights activists to 
issue complaints for non-compliance to the US Trade Representative to potentially sanction 
the state in question by withholding trade or otherwise. Transnational alliances such as those 
established between labour or human rights advocates in the US and workers in South 
America tended to be established in situations where domestic unions were weaker such as 
Paraguay rather than Argentina or Venezuela where they are much stronger (Murillo and 
Schrank, 2010).   
In reconciling these two sets of literatures, Burgess (2010) finds that it has been the 
legacy of the type of labour regime) that prevailed at the point where the pattern of relations 
between the state and labour was established in the mid-twentieth century that heavily 
mediates external actors’ abilities to exert changes either in labour protections or labour 
market flexibility in South America in recent years. For example in labour populist regimes, 
the role of strong unions with close ties to the state and/or a dominant political party 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil), have superseded or mediated that of 
external actors. Meanwhile in states with pluralist welfarism (generous social policies and 
strong rule of law in the context of weak union-state ties (Chile and Uruguay), it has been this 
that has been the confounding variable in external actor pressure. In the one example of 
paternalist dictatorship, (Paraguay), where authoritarian regimes offer high levels of 
protection for individual workers while demanding cooptation and/or quiescence by 
organised labour), and of conservative oligarchy, (Colombia) where the political system is 
elite-dominated—whether democratic or authoritarian—and public policies that strongly 
favour employers, this has been the factor that has shaped any intervention from extra-state 
institutions. 
However the strength of organised labour also impacted upon governance issues in 
other ways. In particular where party-union linkages had been historically embedded and had 
aided intense industrial development (Argentina, Brazil, Peru), union influence on state 
economic policy (protectionism) had been much stronger than those without such linkages 
(Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay) and where labour had not made alliances with populist parties 
(Murillo and Schrank, 2010:250). Interestingly in the early 1980s, Murillo and Schrank also 
identify a correlation between trade union density and the extent to which the state protected 
national industry and jobs against foreign competition (see Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1 Economic protectionism vs Unionisation in Latin America 1981-85 
 
 
 Some interesting differences may also be observed in terms of how the state sought to 
compensate workers for the costs of implement structural adjustment in the 1980s and 90s 
depending on whether a labour-backed party or one from the centre-right was in power. In the 
latter case, divide-and-rule tactics were often put in place to prevent any effective labour 
movement resistance. For instance in Brazil in the 1990s, the centre-right government helped 
to defuse labour opposition to privatisations by encouraging workers in affected firms such as 
Usiminas and Embraer to become mini-capitalist share-holders on attractive terms (Montero, 
1998). However where labour-party linkages existed, compensation packages demanded were 
instead used to help foster rather than buy-out their allies’ resistance. But such tactics and 
attempts at governance that seek to only offer concessions to labour whilst moving forward 
with the substantive adjustments policies were sometimes overturned completely. For 
instance under the conservative government of President Luis Lacalle, in 1992 Uruguayan 
worker and their supporters successfully prevented the privatisation of the state-owned 
telecoms monopoly by enforcing a national referendum (Murillo and Schrank, 2010). 
Similarly in Ecuador in 2002, union-led campaigns forced the abandonment of proposals to 
sell the state’s electricity distributor. 
 Meanwhile where labour’s party ally was in power and the expansion of collective, 
union organisational rights was deemed to offer insufficient compensation for the attacks on 
individual worker rights by part of the union movement, inevitably tensions increased and 
often resulting in significant political costs for the party in question. There are two examples 
of how corporatism demised as a labour governance mechanism in South America in the 
1990s as a result of the exhaustion of an accumulation and redistribution model that created a 
dependency between the state and organised labour. Historically, labour relied on the state for 
economic subsidies and the state relied on labour to provide it the legitimacy to govern. As  
the accumulation model shifted towards one upon which servicing the debt became the goal, 
by the late-1990s the perceived lack of labour autonomy from its party ally which was 
implementing structural adjustment policies and austerity measures both eroded public 
perception of the unions whilst also delegitimising the respective governments’ authority to 
govern a heavily indebted economy (Coker, 2001). In Venezuela the exceptionalism thesis 
that deemed the nation immune from the intercenine struggles, acute class conflicts and racial 
animosity observed elsewhere in the region’s political and social turbulence proved 
moribund. Whilst the the 1989 Caracazo and the CTV led-general strikes in the 1990s finally 
ended the myth long before the election of President Chavez in 1998 that Venezuela, unlike 
her fellow regional states was what Washington had deemed a ‘model of democracy’ in that 
it was stable, had successfully marginalised the Left and avoided union militancy (Ellner, 
2005), the pro-Chavista National Workers’ Union (UNT) split from the CTV. Meanwhile in  
Argentina, a number of constituent trade unions split from the CGT in 1991 to form the 
Argentinian Workers Central Union (CTA) in protest at President Memen’s neoliberal 
reforms. These episodes also demonstrated that organised labour’s historical reliance on 
political structures in both counties had ultimately weakened the defence of class interests at 
the expense of labour’s ability to act as a unified, yet independent actor. 
Finally, it is useful to note how South American governments sought to pacify 
organised labour when their neoliberal reforms did not detrimentally affect workers per se 
(but public services, welfare etc), or only attacked a few unions in specific sectors. In such 
cases, unions found it hard to muster widespread resistance. The simplest way to mitigate 
opposing unions in the latter case was to compensate them (Raúl Madrid, 2003a, p. 63) either 
by offering union leaders government posts (a favoured strategy of President Menem and the 
Justicialista Party PJ in Argentina) or by providing financial compensation such as shares in 
the privatised enterprise,  to affected unions. However, as Murillo and Scrank (2010:263) 
note, rather than being understood as simple “bribery”, often genuine long-term were made 
for the union. In Argentina, union leaders soon controlled the labour ministry and national 
health administration agency, union debts were bailed out by the state, and the unions’ 
monopoly control over the provision of health insurance was maintained. 
 
Labour resurgence under the Pink Tide? (2000s-2016) 
There can be little doubt that labour has enjoyed a revival under the newly elected centre-left 
and left-wing governments that swept across the region over the last two decades. Returning 
to our disaggregated analysis of individual and collective rights, in their belief that the 
increased labour-flexibility which generated greater precariousness and wage-suppression 
had fundamentally failed, the Pink Tide governments have focused on reversing the 
neoliberal doctrine that stripped down individual rights by raising the minimum wage 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), restricting the use of precarious contracts (Argentina, 
Chile), ensuring that labour law enforcement is strengthened (Brazil, Chile) and regulating 
subcontracting (Chile, Uruguay). Although conveniently categorised together under the Pink 
Tide banner, even within this grouping, we witness significant differences in states’ policies 
towards labour. For instance, the restoration of collective rights and, union-promoting 
measures such as expanding industry-wide bargaining (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) have 
represented real advances in this area and symbolise their inclusive approach to social 
dialogue and supporting unionisation, whereas Chile’s “left” government has overlooked this 
entirely whilst supporting individual rights (Cook and Bazler, 2013). 
These policy measures have been taken in spite of these South American governments 
manifesting distinct neoliberal continuity with respect to their macroeconomic orientation. 
The literature on leftist governments in South America has mistakenly labelled such policies 
as ‘populist,’ espousing the notion that they have merely returned to traditional means by 
which governments relate to unions. However, such approaches ignore the nuances and novel 
ways that state-labour dynamics have been reconstituted since the early 2000s (Cook and 
Bazler, 2013). Indeed, it is more prudent to understand the transformation in labour 
governance strategies as part of a ‘post-neoliberal’ politics (Grugel and Riggirozi, 2012; 
Wylde, 2012) involving a hybrid of populist and corporatist industrial mediation which both 
revives traditional models from the mid-twentieth century whilst also preserving some 
elements of neoliberal state-labour relations by proliferating the use of casualised labour and 
informal work.  
Where Pink Tide administrations have broken with the labour governance structures 
of the past include committing themselves to creating a more level playing field in labour-
management relations, focusing on enhancing social equality and in particular incorporating 
previously neglected and less traditional sectors of the working class both in social dialogue 
and policy coverage. For instance, legal and institutional resources are now also dedicated to 
supporting worker-recovered companies especially in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela) 
(Ozarow and Croucher, 2014), unionising informal and precarious workers and creating 
social policies for unemployed and landless populations. 
Of course some countries have not elected such governments and have experienced 
almost unmitigated continuity with neoliberal forms of state-labour relations. In Colombia for 
instance, endemic violence continues to be used by paramilitary death squads against trade 
union activists, suppressing the power of unions to resist ongoing labour flexibilisation whilst 
the Uribe and more recently Santos Presidencies effectively turn a blind eye.  
 What is certain is that current typologies that are used to understand the differences 
between post-neoliberal governments in South America are inadequate. In particular, a more 
sophisticated explanation for why each Pink Tide government adopted a distinct series of 
labour governance regimes is required. This should encompass variables such as union 
density and strength, political party allies, historical legacies surrounding the pattern of 
relations between the state and labour, openness to external actor pressure (either for 
increased labour flexibility or protections) and labour market dynamics. Cook and Bazler’s 
(2013) appeal for new categorizations of left regimes built on the role of unions and labour 
policies may do well to benefit from Yates, and Bakker’s (2014) ‘counter-neoliberalisation 
scenarios. Thus, one could for instance re-classify Peru and Chile as examples of ‘residual 
neoliberalization’ where orthodox neoliberal ideology questioned, but neoliberal tendencies 
persist in practice, according to a series of residual impulses. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 
may be described as states where one can witness ‘disarticulated counter-neoliberalization,’ 
in which unions benefit from the promotion of market-constraining regulatory strategies 
within dispersed politico-institutional arenas but embedded within a regulatory apparatus that 
is broadly neoliberal. Then there are those which may be grouped into the ‘orchestrated 
counter-neoliberalization’ category whereby there is a movement and union-based and/or 
‘statist’ coordination of market-constraining regulatory experiments across territories and 
scales, along with practices of knowledge-sharing, policy-transfer, and institution-building 
that directly challenge neoliberal orthodoxy. Venezuela and to some degree Bolivia and 
Ecuador may fall under such a bracket. These re-categorisations need to be sharpened and 
elaborated upon but an initial attempt has been made here. 
 
Conclusion: Contemporary challenges for labour governance regimes 
Labour remains a vital actor in Latin American governance today. Studies confirm that it 
surpasses all other societal groups in terms of its ability to obtain policy concessions as a 
consequence of collective action efforts because worker strikes bestow significant political 
and financial costs to governments (Tenorio, 2014). They are also less susceptible to 
demobilization tactics from political leaders than other sectors and social actors.  
 Yet a number of major challenges remain for South American governance with 
respect to the labour unions. First, the disparity persists between the region’s relatively strong 
de jure labour legislation but failings in de facto compliance. The weak rule of law in this 
regard helps to explain the high number of complaints lodged with the ILO and especially its 
Committee on Freedom of Association that have emanated from the region. Workers cannot 
reasonably expect their labour union rights to be respected by local employers or enforced by 
local authorities. The regulatory role of the ILO and other extra-state institutions is likely to 
expand in the future but as we saw earlier, governments can ignore even their non-
sanctionable rulings and recommendations. Ironically those worker protections that are 
written into trade pacts continue to present greater opportunity costs to governments if they 
are infringed. Ultimately though, none of these are long-term solutions and left-leaning 
governments need to legitimise their pro-worker agendas but establishing or reinforcing 
compliance bodies to ensure that both domestic labour laws and international regulatory 
frameworks are adhered to. 
 Secondly, union density remains low across the region and outside of Argentina and 
Uruguay this continues to fall. Whilst this is part of a global trend marking the tertiarisation 
of the economy, mass privatisations, loss off hundreds of thousands of jobs in the 1980s and 
90s that the unions still haven’t recovered from, this is compounded by the fact that aside 
from Brazil and the two southern cone countries mentioned, unions are enterprise-based 
which means that a sizable part of the workforce cannot even form and join unions as their 
enterprises are not large enough (Bronstein, 2010). Further, it is much more difficult for such 
unions to influence state policy to achieve improved labour protections if industrial action 
they may take is atomised at plant level or if they fall outside of national collective 
bargaining agreements. Whilst these patterns of industrial relations are deeply embedded in 
most countries and may not even be desired by the majority of workers themselves, this 
sentiment may change during the next economic crisis when such labour movements when 
the importance of organising beyond the enterprise becomes more acute.  
 Thirdly, the scope of labour law has narrowed (Bronstein, 2010:40) as the proportion 
of workers in non-waged forms of work expands and whom are not covered by social 
security or labour union protection. Whilst the average proportion of the working population 
across Latin America in informal work is 40 percent, this reaches 80 percent in Bolivia, Peru 
and Paraguay (Melguizo, 2015). Whilst the changing nature of work and low unionisation 
rates (just 15 percent in Chile) present a threat to the future role of labour unions in policy-
making, many such as the two factions of Argentina’s CTA now affiliate unemployed, 
informal or newly-formed cooperative workers. Meanwhile, new federal laws in Brazil and 
Argentina offer protections to informal workers such as the waste-pickers. Given that these 
transformations in the means of work are likely to deepen, those South American unions that 
haven’t already should consider broadening their membership criteria to help improve their 
membership rates, adapt to the realities of the contemporary labour market and preserve their 
legitimacy as the principle representative labour body to the state and to workers themselves.  
 Finally, at the time of writing in 2016, whilst several states have recently re-elected 
‘Pink Tide’ governments (Brazil, 2014; Uruguay, 2014) the election of the PRO’s President 
Mauricio Macri in Argentina in late-2015 seems to mark the resurgence of ‘new right’ 
governments in the region that prioritise corporate interests and labour flexibilisation. The 
right-wing Democratic Unity (UD) won a clear majority over President Maduro’s party in 
Venezuela’s parliament in their 2015 election and he may well lose the next Presidential 
election. Further, Peru’s Presidential elections have seen a run-off between two conservative 
candidates; Keiko Fujimori and Pedro Kuczynski and not only does President Dilma Rousseff 
in Brazil face all-time low poll ratings, but its lower house voted to start impeachment 
proceedings against her over charges of manipulating government accounts in April 2016. The 
next Brazilian President is almost certainly to come not from the Workers’ Party but from centrist 
parties with more market-orientated agendas and no links to the labour unions such as the Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB) or the Democrats.  
 The question is, what will the return of the new right mean for the unions and labour 
governance in the region? In reality, many of the pro-labour policies enacted over the past two 
decades will be difficult to reverse. This is the case for two reasons. First, such governments 
will face unsurmountable labour resistance if they attempt to do so, especially in those 
countries with higher union densities, centralised union structures, militant labour traditions 
and where the unions are strong in the export-dependent sectors upon which such economies 
will be sustained). Secondly, both extra-state actors like the ILO which will continue to 
monitor the potential rolling back of core standards such as collective bargaining, and the 
enhanced discourse around labour rights in general among international fora will act as 
pressures against these governments’ attempts to reverse such gains too substantially or to 
flexibilise labour markets significantly. 
 However, one area that new pro-market governments in these countries may wish to 
advance on (and will find support in the ILO) is to ‘liberalise’ the labour union relations 
system by weakening the strongest union confederation that enjoys corporatist privileges, 
such as those in Argentina and Brazil or those with party-union linkages (Peru and 
Venezuela). Their rationale will be to allow smaller unions to receive full legal recognition so 
that they can compete in a kind of ‘market’ for worker allegiance. Such are the nuances and 
complexities of governance of labour issues in South America that if they succeed in 
achieving this, the outcome will surely weaken the largest union confederations but 
paradoxically, the broader labour movement may gain advantages and become more united in 
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